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Network operators collect huge amount of user data flowing on their networks.
The purpose of one specific type of data collection is to understand the network
usage pattern and network monitoring for anomaly detection etc.
Network operators share this data confidentially with equipment manufactures
and vendors to make statistical analysis over the data to find the unusual
behavior e.g. Malware traffic etc. Since this data contains user identifiable
information, there is a need to anonymize such data sets to protect user privacy
and to comply with privacy laws. Thus, protecting user privacy is top priority
for the network operator and they are also legally obliged to do so.
The analysis presented in this thesis work is based on data sets, obtained
from network traces (LTE, IP). For some usage, these data sets are required
to be anonymized. There are various classes of algorithms to achieve this e.g.
Encryption, Hashing, Field suppression, κ-anonymity, `-diversity, t-closeness,
Differential Privacy etc. Since none of these algorithms are individually perfect
for anonymizing data completely, these should be used in conjunction with
each other to get the better level of anonymization without compromising the
usability and semantic integrity of the data.
Differential privacy and `-diversity algorithms are implemented in this thesis for
anonymization of network traces along with process pipeline for them. Compari-
son of statistical properties of both original and perturbed data is also presented
to check the efficiency of anonymization techniques.
Keywords: Data Privacy, Differential Privacy, `-diversity, κ-anonymity
Language: English
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Huge amount of user data is being collected and processed for various pur-
poses such as measuring network performance, network anomaly detection
etc. This data is gathered from users and hence contains some personal data
or personal identifying information (PII)[6]. This data is often utilized for
various business purposes without taking care of user privacy which opens
the window of opportunity for adversaries to correlate and obtain in depth
knowledge about the user profiles.
Mobile operators are obliged by law to protect their customer’s privacy.
The data collected by mobile operators contains sensitive information about
their customers. There is a requirement for the mobile operators to share
this data with other partners and equipment manufactures for detecting ab-
normal network behavior, or anomaly in the network traffic. Sharing the
original data of the customers expose them to inference attacks or possible
re-identification of the users, thus there arrive a need to anonymize this kind
of network data.
Anonymizing network data is not an easy task considering its semantics
and properties of its fields i.e. continuous and discrete fields and it is also
difficult to balance between the level of anonymization and usefulness of the
output data. One needs to parameterize the privacy preserving algorithms
to tune the trade-off between data utility and data privacy.
1.1 Objectives
The main objectives of this thesis work are as follows:
• To analyze the network trace data from IP and mobile network envi-
11
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ronment and make statistical analysis to observe its properties.
• To identify the sensitive and non-sensitive fields in the trace data and to
observe if combination of some of these fields can provide information
about users or traffic behavior.
• To demonstrate privacy preserving algorithms such as Differential pri-
vacy and `-diversity, to anonymize different fields of network trace data
and compare their statistical properties.
1.2 Structure
This thesis is divided into following chapters.
Chapter 2 sets the basis for understanding the main objectives of this
work. It provides fundamental concepts about privacy along with its defini-
tion, need for privacy in user data and some basic understanding about the
meaning of the terms Personal Data and PII (Personally Identifiable Infor-
mation). Chapter 3 provides understating about the state of the art privacy
preserving algorithms i.e. Differential privacy, κ-anonymity and `-diversity
with detailed examples. The chapter also lists the parameters used in these
algorithms by which level of anonymization can be controlled. Chapter 4
presents a sample of network trace and discuss about the information con-
tent in it. The chapter also gives detailed statistical analysis over each field
of the data using various visualization methods and provides results in the
form of various statistics to present better overview of the traffic pattern and
nature of data.
Chapter 5 describes some novel techniques of noise addition which can be
employed on continuous fields such as numerical and temporal. Various noise
addition techniques are used to perturb these fields and corresponding results
are compared using statistical parameters e.g. mean and standard deviation
and five number summary. Chapter 6 describes an anonymization technique
for discrete fields of the data sets e.g. protocol field, which is anonymized
using `-diversity technique. Chapter 7 presents the conclusion and future
outlook for extension of this work.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter presents the basis for understanding the data privacy and its
need in user’s data. In many cases, Privacy results in information loss hence
the trade-off between the privacy and data utility is also need to be discussed.
The chapter also covers the discussion regarding personal and sensitive in-
formation present in user’s data in both general and network domain.
2.1 Definition of privacy
Privacy is recognized as fundamental human right which is protected in var-
ious regions in the world. There has been lot of discussion amongst lawyers,
philosophers and other social scientists in particular Daniel J. Solove, Helen
Nissenbaum [7] about privacy issues. With the advent of information and
computer science technologies, where data is being collected at larger scale,
raises concerns about the privacy of an individual [8].
Every human needs privacy in his life as his fundamental right which in-
cludes choice of living life in his or her own determined way. Based on this
fundamental definition of privacy, data privacy can be defined as primary
right to the data or information regarding some person. This data or infor-
mation might be created either by that person or by someone else by just
observing or by processing over that information.
The main idea behind privacy is that any individual should be indepen-
dent to take any decisions regarding his life without any interference. The
same idea follows in data privacy that any individual should have control over
the use of his information. These two ideas relate and support each other
within the privacy domain since as we humans need privacy in our lives, our
13
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data/information also demands privacy [9].
2.2 Need for privacy
Most of the government agencies and other organizations, such as population
registrar or tax offices, collect personal data which is mandatory for example,
census data for counting on population and tax data of the citizens etc. The
census data, voter registration data or hospital data can be published for
research and statistical analysis purposes, in public interest. Some data is
however collected for the altruistic purpose to diagnosis some problems i.e.
Malware infected network trace from the internet to find unusual behaviors
and share the results with the public or to raise the awareness of the problem
[10].
Due to the growing use of internet based applications, which have digi-
tized most of the businesses, have also introduces drawbacks such as looking
at the usage patterns of a social media profile of a person can help to pre-
dict his behavior, interests and sexual orientation, or guessing if a woman is
pregnant based on what she is purchasing online is reality nowadays.
There are, however, some business needs to collect customers data. The
data collection allows companies to know their customers in better way and
treat them accordingly, this is done by extracting useful insight from cus-
tomer’s data which is required for behavioral and targeted marketing. This
helps companies to identify what kind of product to offer to customers in
future, which in turns provides a great value of personalized products to the
customers. [11].
2.3 Sharing network traces
Stakkato’s attack [12] is known for worldwide cyber-attack which was car-
ried out for almost two years and effected many popular government websites
such as US military, NASA and many universities. Network traces collected
by authorities contained the fingerprints of such attack but they also con-
tained the sensitive information about that organization and sharing the raw
network trace could lead to the unintended disclosure of the information. A
network trace can contains all network traffic which includes websites visited
by the users, location of their emails and any other credentials which are not
secured by encryption. Thus sharing raw network trace is big problem.
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Data sharing can provide the benefit for detecting fingerprints of popular
security attacks such as DDoS attack or Malware detection. The information
flow from different sources can enable wider scope of analysis of the data but
as a matter of fact sharing of network traces between the research organi-
zations is very limited since network traces contain personally identifiable
information of the people inside the organization whose privacy might be on
the stake [13].
This is the same case for mobile network operators who collect their
customer data to analyze and troubleshoot network problems or detecting
anomalies. There are however, times when this data need to be shared with
other partners or third parties. Since this data can reveal personal identifying
information like IP address or location data, it will be unwise to share raw
data with third parties, who might process it to identify some individuals.
Hence there arises a need to anonymize such form of data, this is where role
of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET) comes into play [14].
2.4 Cases of popular privacy breaches
2.4.1 Netflix user privacy breach
Most popular privacy breaches resulted when Netflix released their user’s
data of movie rating of their 500,000 subscribers for the purpose of improv-
ing their movie recommendation engine based on individual preferences. Al-
though, they anonymized the data set by replacing the real name of the sub-
scribers with random numbers but later it became possible for researchers to
reconstruct the identities of some individuals by mapping them to publically
available IMDB database [15]. Movie rating can prove to be sensitive infor-
mation about some person as it can reveal some person’s view about politics,
religion or homosexuality.
2.4.2 AOL anonymous data
Similar case happened with AOL, when they released user search queries to
internet community for research purpose but later they turned it down be-
cause many of users were identified by their search queries. As the number
search queries collected for specific user increased, it even became easier to
trace back to that user. A 60 years old widow woman living in Georgia state
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in USA having three dogs was identified by her search queries about ’60 years
old single man’ and ’dogs that urinates on everything’ [16].
2.4.3 Identification of medical records of former gov-
ernor of Massachusetts
One type of inference attack (a kind of attack for illegitimately gaining knowl-
edge about a target by analyzing the data) was demonstrated by Latanya
Sweeney [17], where she exposed the medical condition of the governor of
Massachusetts by mapping two kinds of data. one kind of data was obtained
from Group Insurance Commission (GIC) who were responsible for health
insurance of government staff. Other kind of data was obtained from Mas-
sachusetts voter registration department. Latanya Sweeney demonstrated
that the tuple zip code, birth date and sex were shared attributes in both
the data sets which caused the re-identification of governor of Massachusetts
.
2.5 Trade-off between data utility and data
privacy
Publishing data provides useful information for the researchers but exposes
the risk on people’s privacy where attacker can launch an inference attack by
mapping the data set with other publically released data set to re-identify
some individuals.
Many privacy mechanisms transform data to some other form i.e. hash-
ing, encryption etc. in order to ensure privacy but as a result information
loss is high in these methods. Modifying the representation of the data by
changing it to some other form might yield better privacy but results in great
loss of data utility. Data utility is defined as the measure of the usefulness
of the data to its consumers. The general idea about privacy and utility
trade-off in network domain is the more data is removed or obfuscated from
a network trace file, the better privacy can be assured to the users while of
data will less useful to the researchers who make analysis over it [18].
The privacy and utility are inversely proportional to each other and it’s
difficult to calculate the balance point between them. A balance point be-
tween data privacy and information loss depends on used cases and applica-
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tions for which anonymized data will be used [19].
2.6 Personal Data and PII (Personally Iden-
tifying Information)
The terms Personal Data and Personally Identifiable Information are synony-
mous and can be interchanged in many contexts. The term, Personal data
comes from EU directives and legislation [20] and term personally identified
information (PII) comes from US privacy laws [21]. The definition of both
terms coincide each other and roughly points to the same meaning. In this
thesis, term Personal Data is used for convenience. European Union pub-
lished new General publication Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which
defined personal data as:
’Any type of information which can be utilized with other set of informa-
tion or on its own to discover or recognize some individuals, locations or
from which any other useful piece of personal information can be extracted’
[22].
And
’Personal data is any information relating to an individual, whether it re-
lates to his or her private, professional or public life. It can be anything from
a name, a photo, an email address, bank details, posts on social networking
websites, medical information, or a computer’s IP address.’
Examples of personal data in EU and US privacy laws are as below:
• Full name
• Home address
• Social Security Number
• Date of birth
• Telephone number
There are two types of attributes, which often appear in the data sets
namely sensitive attributes and non-sensitive attributes. The definition is
given below.
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Sensitive attributes are kind of attributes which can directly identify an
individual such as health condition, email addresses etc. So the association
between an individual and his sensitive attributes should not be disclosed i.e.
it would not be permissible to hospitals to disclose which patient has cancer
disease. All other attributes apart from sensitive attributes are considered
as non-sensitive attributes as they are shared by many people for example,
gender, age, zip code and others.
Combination of some non-sensitive attributes in the data set is known as
Quasi-identifiers [23]. A Quasi identifier can be used to re-identify individuals
from the data set by mapping it to the external data. An example of Quasi
identifier is the tuple of Age, gender and zip code in voter registration list.
In network trace, quasi identifiers can be a tuple of time-stamp, protocol and
packet length.
2.7 IP address as personal data
The discussion on IP address being personal data is very broad. In European
privacy laws IP address is personal data (UK is exception here) while in US
laws it isn’t. Here are few arguments that why and why not an IP address
can be considered as personal data [24].
IP address as personal data
• IP address can refer to a person, an entity or a place via geo-location
coordinates [25].
• If the IP address is assigned by an ISP (Internet Service Provider)
under subscriber account then it can be used to identify the subscriber
and hence it is personal data.
• Even though IP address changes most often but ISPs keep the record
of internet activities of the customers and logs the data that who is as-
signed what IP and when, can enable the tracking of some individuals.
• Most Internet websites create profile of their customer’s activities if
they have been assigned a static IP address. The profile contains cus-
tomer’s browsing behavior and other online activities on that website.
Some websites collect demographic information about their users by IP
address to show the number of visitors based on countries.
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IP address as non-personal data
• An IP address in isolation is not personal data as it targets a machine
and not an individual, however combination of some data fields with
IP address can be considered as personal data.
• An IP address is mostly not permanent and keeps changing. IP ad-
dress assigned to one computer may have been assigned to some other
computer one week ago.
• Several computers using NAT (Network Address Translation)or DHCP
(Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) service to access internet via
only one public IP, makes it hard to trace back the user.
2.8 Summary
This Chapter gives some background knowledge to understand the data pri-
vacy. The question of why privacy is needed in user data is also discussed
in detail. In addition to that, this chapter lists some of the most popular
privacy breaches occurred in user data in past i.e. Netflix and AOL attacks.
This chapter also explains most commonly used terms in privacy field i.e.
PII and personal data. In the end, a brief explanation is presented about
whether an IP address being personal data or not with some arguments on
both sides.
Chapter 3
Privacy preserving algorithms
This chapter introduces some data anonymization techniques namely differ-
ential privacy, κ-anonymity and `-diversity. At first, data privacy process is
discussed along with some fundamental concepts of data anonymization and
noise addition. Later in this chapter, fundamental concepts behind these
techniques are discussed in details with the examples of network data.
3.1 Data privacy process
Data privacy process is described by figure 3.1. The process of data anonymiza-
tion starts from removing direct identifiers (hiding/removal of sensitive at-
tributes) and then perturbing the data fields by using privacy preserving
algorithms. Noise is usually added to the data field for perturbation pur-
pose. In the end, the sensitive data fields are completely suppressed to get
the final anonymized data Set [26].
Figure 3.1: A typical flow chart of privacy preserved network trace.
As mentioned in previous chapter that inferences can be made to some
individuals by mapping the anonymized data with another set of released
data therefore noise is added to the original data fields after suppressing
personal data to increase further confidentiality of the data set.
20
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3.2 Foundational concepts
Data anonymization is performed to protect the privacy of the people whose
information is present in that data set so that it can be shared with third
parties, other organizations or even with data agencies for making statistical
analysis and post-anonymization observations on it. To avoid any unintended
disclosure, the data should be anonymized in such a way that information
of the people in the data sets remains completely anonymous. Traditionally,
data anonymization is performed by hashing the data fields. The hashing
functions get the set of data and change it to the fixed length representation.
Thus hashing only changes the representation of the data but not the infor-
mation content in it. Due to significant advent in computing power which
opens possibilities to recover original values from hashes and also through
pre-computed hash tables also known as rainbow tables, it is possible to re-
cover original data from the hashed data. Considering these possibilities, it
would be difficult to rely on such methods [19] [23].
3.2.1 Noise addition
The purpose of the noise addition is to preserve the overall distribution of the
data, while still anonymizing the individual records to prevent the exposure
of original data values. Adding noise to original data values provides defense
against inference attacks which involves exact matching of the data for some
particular attributes, obtained from publically released data [27].
Noise addition can be additive or multiplicative. In Additive noise, a ran-
dom number is added with each element of the data, while in multiplicative
noise, random number is multiplied with every element of data set. Typically,
random value used for noise addition is chosen from normal distribution with
zero mean and small standard deviation [26].
Figure 3.2 (a) depicts the controlled noise addition in the original values
such that the perturbed data distribution almost follows the original pattern,
while figure 3.2 (b) shows the overmuch noise addition in original data such
that the pattern of the original distribution cannot be identified from the
perturbed data. It is obvious to note that controlled noise addition preserves
the statistical properties of the original data while overmuch noise addition
completely ruins the original data and makes it completely useless for anal-
ysis.
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Many privacy preserving algorithms have been introduced in recent years.
In this work, differential privacy, κ-anonymity and `-diversity algorithms are
discussed with their salient features and used cases.
(a) Examples of controlled noise addition (b) Examples of uncontrolled noise addi-
tion
Figure 3.2: Examples of controlled and uncontrolled noise addition [1]
3.3 Differential privacy
Differential privacy is a technique to obfuscate the data fields using Laplace
noise addition and was introduced by Cynthia Dwork in 2006. Differential
privacy mechanism assures that output of any analysis is not greatly affected
if a single record in a data set is added or removed, so the mechanism provides
guarantee that an input of any person either included or excluded in the data
set would not change the final distribution of the result significantly, even if
the information of an individual is perturbed, the output is nearly unchanged.
Thus differential privacy guarantees the information privacy of an individual
in a data set [28].
3.3.1 Mathematical definition
Consider two neighboring data sets D1, D2. The neighboring data sets are
the data sets which differ only from one entry, one row or one record. They
produce output S when mechanism K which satisfies -differential privacy,
is applied. The mechanism K, which might be a randomized function to
add jitter to some data field, fulfills the condition about the information
disclosure related to any individual. Information disclosure is the leakage
of information about any individual violating his/her privacy. Differential
privacy algorithm states that probability of data set D1 producing output S
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is nearly the same as the probability of data set D2 producing same output
[10] [28].
Dwork’s definition of differential privacy is following:
A randomized function K satisfies -differential privacy if for all pairs of
adjacent databases D′ and D′′, and all S ⊆ Range(K),
Pr[K(D′) ∈ S] ≤ e × Pr[K(D′′) ∈ S] (3.1)
Here,  is known as privacy parameter. The value of  corresponds to the
strength of the privacy. This value is not fixed and depends on the used case
[10]. Differential privacy uses Laplace noise to perturb data fields. Laplace
noise addition depends on the sensitivity and privacy parameter . These
concepts are discussed in next sections.
3.3.2 Sensitivity
Sensitivity is the maximum amount the outputs that can be perturbed by
adding or removing some records from the data sets. This measures how
much output can be altered if a response is either included or excluded from
the result.
Sensitivity of the function is connected to differential privacy since in
order to make a query differentially private, the amount of noise to be added
in the query is proportional to its sensitivity. To get an idea about the value
of sensitivity, if a data set is queered that ’how many rows have certain
property will yield sensitivity value of 1’ [28].
3.3.3 Laplace Noise
The Laplace mechanism is used for adding noise to the data sets which sat-
isfies the Laplace statistical distribution. Below is the mathematical formula
for adding random noise using Laplace mechanism
b = ∆f/
Where b is known as Laplace noise, ∆f is the sensitivity value and  is
privacy parameter. When the query on function f with data set X is made,
the mechanism K responds with
f(X) + ∆f/
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By meaning, random noise with the magnitude Lap (∆f/) will be added to
all elements of data set X. Here, if the value of  is decreased, the amount of
noise will increase and vice versa, when the value of sensitivity is fixed, for
example if the sensitivity value is 1 and if  is taken as 0.1, the magnitude
of noise added will be 10. Similarly if  is 0.01, the noise magnitude will
increase to 100 [29].
Differential privacy is state of art technique for preserving privacy but
it also suffers from some weaknesses for example with the increase of small
value of , statistical properties of the data like mean, standard deviation etc,
can change dramatically so it can be challenging to maintain good utility
of the data. Figure 3.3 shows the probability density function of Laplace
distribution with mean 0 and different values of scale parameter b.
Figure 3.3: Example of Laplace Distribution [2]
3.4 κ-anonymity
κ-anonymity is the data anonymizing technique, introduced by Latanya Sweeney
in 2002, by which personally identifiable information is removed from the
data set or changed into some state for useful analysis and processing. κ-
anonymity technique had been mostly used in anonymizing medical data sets
[17].
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The main idea behind κ-anonymity is to form a group of k records or rows
in such a way that they possess similar features, for example, group of rows
that look identical and indistinguishable. In the same way, in κ-anonymized
data set each row is indistinguishable from at least κ-1 other rows within the
data set for some set of identifying attributes.
Once can think of κ-anonymity as in example that if someone tries to find
an individual in the released data but the only information available about
that individual is his/her birth date and gender. There will be k other per-
sons in the released data with the same birth data and gender thus making
linkage ambiguous [17]. The three well known methods used to achieve these
κ-anonymity attributes, are generalization, suppression and perturbation.
In generalization, the original value of the data field is replaced by a
general categorical value that only contains small amount of information for
example replacing last octet of IP address with * to hide user identifying
information. In suppression technique, the data fields are omitted and re-
placed by a null value, this is done with some sensitive fields. In contrary,
perturbation technique doesn’t omit the data field but obfuscate them with
new value by adding noise to it, for example, perturbing the original values
of times-tamp field in network trace by adding random noise. The figure 3.4
portrays above concepts.
Figure 3.4: Example of generalization, suppression and perturbation.
3.4.1 Example of κ-anonymity
Consider a data table containing information about some individuals about
their age, sex, marital status and working hours shown in figure 3.5. In this
data, even though direct identifiers like name, email address, social security
number etc. are removed, but combination of given fields can lead to the
linkage attack with the help of other data set. Hence, there is need to κ-
anonymize this data set using the generalization and suppression techniques
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such that any inference to any individual cannot be made.
Figure 3.5: A data table containing information of the employees.
2-anonymous version of the original data set is shown in figure 3.6, where
k=2. It is easy to notice that some fields are suppressed completely while
others are suppressed to certain level so that information loss can be con-
trolled thus making data set useful for analysis [3].
Figure 3.6: 2-anonymous data table [3].
There are some unique records like number 6 in the above data set, which
are hard to remove even though they are anonymized. In large data set, these
records are considered as outliers which might lead to re-identification of the
records. If these types of records are small in number in the data set, they can
be fully suppressed, which will have only negligible effect on the anonymized
data set [23].
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3.4.2 Example of κ-anonymity in network data
Consider a sample of network data containing some fields like time stamp,
source IP, protocol and info field as shown in figure 3.7. The combination
of certain fields in this data set can provide the additional information that
can lead to identification of some individuals.
Figure 3.7: A sample of network data.
The 2-anonymous version of the original data set is shown in figure 3.8.
In order to get 2-anonymous data set, an Info field is completely suppressed,
while time-stamp field is partially suppressed to get some data utility. 2-
anonymous data set implies that there are at-least two similar and indistin-
guishable records present in the data set.
Figure 3.8: 2-anonymous network data table
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3.4.3 Attacks on κ-anonymity
κ-anonymity technique is vulnerable to inference attacks if the attacker has
some prior knowledge about the data. For example, in network data set, if
the attacker knows the IP address of somebody, he can know that what kind
of traffic is being generated by that user, this is called background knowledge
attack. If IP addresses are anonymized, then it can difficult to find such traffic
patterns but again consider a case when there are only few types of protocol
types present in the data set, then it can be easy for attacker to correlate a
user from anonymized IP addresses against the protocol field. Due to these
attacks, a new technique called `-diversity was introduced and preferred over
κ-anonymity [30].
3.5 `-Diversity
It is shown earlier that κ-anonymity suffers from some attacks so there is
need for a robust notion of privacy in data sets. `-Diversity technique was
introduced to address this problem. The main idea behind this technique
is data sets should be divided into blocks so that each block should contain
diverse values of sensitive attributes of the data set. Machanavajjhala et al.
defines `-diversity principle as below:
”A q∗-block is `-diverse if contains at least ` ”well-represented” values for
the sensitive attribute S. A table is `-diverse if every q∗-block is `-diverse.”
[31]
3.5.1 Example of `-diversity in network data
`-Diversity ensures that every block of data in the data set should have ”well-
represented” values or in other words, at lease ` diverse values for sensitive
attributes within each equivalence class should be present. Figure 3.9 shows
a sample of some fields from network data set. 3-diverse version of this data
sample is shown in figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.9: A data table of network traffic
Figure 3.10: 3-diverse data
3.5.2 Limitation of `-diversity
Although `-diversity overcomes the limitations of κ-anonymity but it doesn’t
provides the protection from identity disclosure and attribute disclosure in
some cases. `-diversity suffers from two major attacks known as skewness
attack and similarity attack.
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In skewness attack [32], the distribution of sensitive attributes is skewed,
meaning that for a 2-diverse table if there are 99 percent negative values and
1 percent positive values of sensitive attributes, which could happen for a
test result i.e. HIV having only positive and negative values. In this case,
`-diversity seems to be useless since there are 99 percent chances of guessing
the correct disease of the victim. Similarly, for a 2-diverse equivalence class,
any individual can be identified by the probability of 50 percent if there are
only two values of sensitive attribute .
In similarity attack [32], the values of sensitive attributes are semanti-
cally same since `-diversity doesn’t consider the semantic of the values of
sensitive attributes, for example in a block of `-diverse data set, the sensitive
attribute refer to same equivalence class i.e. in medical data set, diverse table
containing disease values as stomach cancer, gastritis and ulcer still provides
potential information to the attacker. So its a problem with `-diversity that
it doesn’t understand the meaning of sensitive attributes.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, some basic concepts regarding data anonymization and noise
addition are discussed with flow chart of data privacy process. Three tech-
niques of data anonymization i.e. differential privacy, κ-anonymity and `-
diversity are presented along with examples of network data. Some attacks
on κ-anonymity techniques and limitation of `-diversity technique are also
discussed.
Chapter 4
Network trace files
This chapter presents the overview of network trace files that how they are
collected and processed, what kind of information they contain. This chap-
ter also provides statistical analysis over network trace file from different
perspectives to understand the type, nature and properties of data set.
4.1 Introduction
A network trace capture is like a wire-tapping over a machine’s or device’s
interface data to intercept what is flowing over the wire. Network traces are
used for analyzing and troubleshooting network related issues and also for
educational and research purposes. In order to understand and get useful
meaning of the network trace, one should know how various protocols func-
tions for examples, how they send and receive data.
Wireshark [33] (previously known as Ethereal) is the most commonly used
tool to capture the network traces and to intercept all the packets flowing
through the machine or network. Figure 4.1 depicts one example of network
trace captured from Wireshark. Wireshark captures, opens and analyzes
each packet flowing through the network interface and produces full insight
of the packet for example, which protocol is used, what are the source and
destination IP addresses with packet length, port number and time of packet
leaving the interface. The purpose of capturing network traces varies from
analyzing network issues, detecting malicious data, monitoring bandwidth
utilization and debugging new communication protocols etc.
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Figure 4.1: Example of a network trace in wireshark.
4.2 Capturing network traces
Network traces can be captured from different interfaces, e.g. from some
computer’s or router’s interface or from mobile network’s Gn interface. Fig-
ure 4.2 depicts the Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) Architecture. All
GPRS support nodes have a interface called Gn interface. This interface is
located between SSGN and other SGNSs and GGSNs. The protocol used by
these nodes is called GTP (GPRS Tunneling Protocol) [4] [34].
The choice of interface to capture the trace depends upon the application
and purpose of the interception. As shown in Figure 4.1, the network trace
contains fields like time, source and destination IP of the packet, protocol
with packet length and some additional information in info field. Info field
contains different kind of information depending on type of interface used
to capture the network trace. If the network trace is captured from a tra-
ditional network, then info field may contains port numbers, ARP requests
and TCP SYN and ACK messages. In case of capture from Gn interface, it
might contain some parameter like IMSI number and IMEI number etc. For
malware capture, info field might contain URL of the malicious code.
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Figure 4.2: Public Land Mobile Network Architecture [4]
4.3 Information content
IP addresses are kind of fields which contain much more information than
it apparently seems. The numbers in different octets in IP address repre-
sent some class, for example, numbers between 0 to 126 in first octet of
the IP address represent class A addresses, 128 to 191 represent class B ad-
dresses and so on. Figure 4.3 shows the types of information obtained from
an IP address. One example of re-identification from IP address class is of
North Korea which only uses one block of IPv4 address that is, 175.45.176.0
- 175.45.179.255 [35]. Thus it’s easy to know that originator of data is from
North Korea if source IP is from above mentioned block of IP addresses.
Figure 4.3: Information contained in an IP address [5].
The protocol, length and info fields contain some sensitive information
but it’s difficult to make some inferences by looking at each field individ-
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ually. Although single fields might not be enough for re-identification but
combination of certain fields like IP address, location data etc. can lead to
re-identification.
There are some functional dependencies among the fields in the network
trace, for example, in protocol and length fields and also between protocol
and port number i.e. HTTP and FTP have port number 80 and 21 respec-
tively. Transport layer protocols like TCP and UDP, carry data payload have
most packets of larger length e.g. more than 1500 bytes. The other man-
agement protocols for example ICMP, DNS etc. have packet lengths mostly
fewer than 200 bytes. So due to this field relation, it might be easy to guess
about the protocol type by looking at packet length. Figure 4.4 depicts the
protocol and packet length dependency chart.
Figure 4.4: Protocol and packet length dependency chart.
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4.4 Statistical analysis on our network trace
Before doing statistical analysis on network data set, one needs to under-
stand the statistical properties of the data. Statistical tools can be utilized
to organize, display and summarize the data. Goal of statistical analysis is
to gain understanding from data.
Mean:It is the average of values after their total sum is taken.
Standard deviation: It is the measure of how data points are deviated
from the mean.
Distribution: Distribution of a variable defines the values, the variable
can take and how often the variable takes these values. Usually distribution
is plotted by histograms or by stem plots.
Spread: Simplest useful numerical description of data consists of both a
measure of center and a measure of spread. One way to describe spread is to
give several percentiles. The p:th percentile is the value such that p% of the
measurements fall at or below it i.e. Median is the 50th, first quartile (Q1)
is the 25th and third quartile (Q3) is the 75th percentile. [36]
Five number summary: The five number summary comprises of min-
imum value, 1st quartile Q1, median, 3rd quartile Q3 and maximum value.
It provides good summary of the distribution in a nutshell. The five number
summary is generally depicted using box plot in which central box spans the
quartiles Q1 and Q3 and line marks the median, lines extend from the box to
mark the maximum and minimum. It is especially suitable for comparison
of distributions.
Network trace file in this thesis work was converted from .pcap to .csv
format for ease of processing. Python modules were used for processing it for
example, CSV module which was used for reading csv files and then Numpy
and Pandas modules which were used for cleaning, transforming, merging
and reshaping the data set, followed by Pylab and Matplotlib modules which
were used for visualizing and plotting the results. This is depicted in figure
4.5.
To start statistical analysis on network trace, packet length distribution
is plotted by a histogram using Matplotlib as shown in figure 4.6. It can
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Figure 4.5: Python modules.
be seen that there are peaks at both left and right hand side. Most of the
packet length falls into two regions, one below 200 bytes and other greater
than 1400 bytes. The peaks at low and high packet length values in the his-
togram show that either there are huge numbers of small packet lengths or
high packet length values. The packet length falling under 200 bytes mostly
refers to management protocol like ARP, DNS, ICMP etc and also TCP SYN
and ACK messages while packet length greater than 1400 bytes are mostly
used for transferring data payload using mostly TCP and UDP protocols.
The five number summary of the packet length distribution presented below
shows that mean is the center of distribution the Q1 and Q3 quartiles shows
the spread of middle half of the data and minimum and maximum values
tells about the full spread of the data.
Five number summary: (Minimum, Q1, Median, Q3, Maximum) = 44,
62, 107, 1414, 1514
Figure 4.6: Histogram of packet length distribution(bins 100).
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Next, histogram of time-stamps of the packets is plotted to check the
time periods when traffic was high. This is depicted in figure 4.7. It can be
observed that there was not much traffic generated for first 100 seconds but
between 200 and 400 seconds traffic volume was high. Thus using time-stamp
histogram plots one can analyze about different traffic patterns and detect
anomalies in it.
Figure 4.7: Histogram of packet Time-stamp distribution (bins 100).
Five number summary: (Minimum, Q1, Median, Q3, Maximum) = 0,
178.96, 282.78, 421.20, 546.15
Figure 4.8 is plotted to further analyze the data set that what are the
most commonly used protocols and their number of occurrence, this will help
to understand the nature of the traffic. With no surprise, they appear to be
frequently used transport layer protocols i.e. TCP and UDP. There are also
high number of mobile network protocol i.e. GTP, UCP and SMPP. The
other management protocols like DNS, ICMP and also security protocols i.e.
TLS, SSL are slightly used. Thus by plotting most frequent protocol chart,
one can infer about the type of traffic being generated by the users.
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Figure 4.8: Bar chart of most used protocols.
It is also good to know about the value of packet lengths to check the
association between the protocol and packet length since some protocol might
be using similar packet length every time. Figure 4.9 shows bar chart of most
used packet length. It can be seen that packet lengths ’54’, ’1514’ and ’62’
are greatly used. Values such as ’54’, ’62’ and ’66’ seems to be used by DNS,
ICMP protocols and also by TCP for sending SYN and ACK message while
values like ’1514’ and ’1414’ are used by transport layer protocol i.e. TCP
and UDP for transferring the data payload.
Figure 4.9: Bar chart of most used packet lengths.
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IP addresses represent much more information than just being numbers.
For various purposes, IP addresses are often classified by their class group
i.e. class A, class B etc. IP addresses can be converted into their respective
classes to check the class distribution to observe which class addresses are
mostly used. Figure 4.10 shows the number of IP addresses of different
classes. It is clearly seen that Class A and Class C addresses are most often
used.
Figure 4.10: Bar chart of IP classes of source and destination.
Lastly, a subplot for different classes of IP addresses can be plotted for
packet length over time-stamps to observe their behavior. Figure 4.11 shows
the subplot of four IP Class addresses. From the figure, it can be inferred
Class A addresses generated high traffic with higher packet length size while
class C addresses have high traffic only at certain intervals. Class B addresses
generated only small amount of traffic. There is not even a single Class D
address used.
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Figure 4.11: Subplot of IP class addresses.
4.5 Summary
This chapter mainly describes the properties of a network trace by doing
statistical analysis over it. In the beginning, chapter describes network traces
and information content in them. Sensitive fields in network traces were
identified. The chapter also presents the python modules used in processing
the network traces. The statistical analysis section contains detailed analysis
over the network trace to understand its properties.
Chapter 5
Implementation of differential pri-
vacy technique
Noise addition is the technique of obfuscating the data for anonymization
purpose while preserving its statistical properties. In network traces, time
stamp and packet length fields are considered to be sensitive, hence random
noise is added in both fields to anonymize them. In this chapter, three novel
techniques of noise addition are discussed with the results. Comparison of the
statistical properties of both original and perturbed data is also presented.
Noise addition techniques used in this work are:
1. Random noise addition through differential Privacy
2. Zero mean random noise addition
3. Random noise addition by summing LSBs
These techniques are discussed in detail with the experiment results below.
5.1 Noise addition through differential pri-
vacy
From chapter 3, it is known that differential privacy uses Laplace noise which
is calculated by the following formula.
b = ∆f/
Where ∆f is the sensitivity of the function and  is the privacy parameter. In
this experiment, sensitivity value is 1 since single numerical value of desired
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field is processed at one time. Therefore in this case, the query ”what is the
value of specific field” yields sensitivity of 1 and then random Laplace noise
is added by selecting appropriate value of .
At first,  value of 0.01 is selected and after applying Laplace noise to packet
length and time stamp field, a histogram of both original and perturbed data
is plotted as shown in figure 5.1 and 5.2. It can be clearly seen in these fig-
ures that noise is added in such a manner that it has modified the individual
records of the data significantly and as a result the perturbed data doesn’t
follow the distribution of the original data and it is also shifted towards high
values resulting in different shape and pattern of the distribution than the
original data. The =0.01 seems to be inappropriate value for this kind of
network trace as noise can destroys useful features of the data fields and
makes statistical analysis useless.
Figure 5.1: Noise addition in Packet length with =0.01
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Figure 5.2: Noise addition in time stamp with =0.01
The selection of appropriate value of privacy parameter  can be chal-
lenging. One has to try different values and check which value of  fits best
for particular kind of data. The value =0.01 produced high amount of noise
earlier. Next value of  is selected as 0.1 and after applying Laplace noise to
each values of packet length and time stamp fields, histograms are plotted to
observe the effect of the changing the  value.
In figure 5.3 and 5.4, original and perturbed data sets are nearly replica
of each other and perturbed data set completely follows the distribution of
the original data set There is also uniqueness in the patterns of raw and
perturbed data as the two data sets increase and decrease together in same
direction. Thus this random noise addition with =0.1, preserve the statis-
tical properties of the original data.
CHAPTER 5. IMPLEMENTATIONOF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY TECHNIQUE44
Figure 5.3: Noise addition in packet length with =0.1
Figure 5.4: Noise addition in time-stamp with =0.1
5.1.1 Comparison between original and perturbed data
Box plots of original and perturbed data set is plotted in figure 5.5 and 5.6
with five number summary. As it can be seen that median or midpoint value
(red line) is around 100 bytes which means that most packet lengths are
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concentrated at low values while the values about the median (upper quar-
tile) are equally distributed and the time stamp values are well dispersed
along the whole data set as the median value is in the middle of the data
set. The perturbed data pattern set on box plots for both packet length
and time stamp fields seems like exact replica of original data which implies
that although original data fields are perturbed but their overall statistical
properties are preserved.
Five number summary of original packet length field:
(Minimum, Q1, Median, Q3, Maximum) = 44, 62, 109, 1414, 1514
Five number summary of perturbed packet length field:
(Minimum, Q1, Median, Q3, Maximum) = 54, 66, 113, 1418, 1524
Five number summary of original time-stamp field:
(Minimum, Q1, Median, Q3, Maximum) = 0, 178, 282, 421, 546
Five number summary of perturbed time-stamp field:
(Minimum, Q1, Median, Q3, Maximum) = 1, 185, 287, 426, 555
Figure 5.5: Box plots of Packet length for original and perturbed data
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Figure 5.6: Box plots of time-stamp for original and perturbed data
In addition to that some statistical properties of both data sets are shown
in table 1. From the statistical parameters, it can be noticed that mean
and standard deviation values of original and perturbed data are quite close
to each other as the noise addition doesn’t greatly ruins these properties
therefore it can be deduced that the privacy parameter value =0.1 is most
suitable for this network trace.
Mean Standard deviation
Original
data
495.54 615.13
Perturbed
data
500.53 615.16
Table 5.1: Statistical properties of original and perturbed data
5.2 Zero Mean Random Noise addition
The main idea in zero mean noise addition technique is to generate noise
vectors whose mean is zero. This technique is used by K. Mivule [26]. In this
technique, data is divided into three parts based on the packet length value.
Then, three noise vectors are generated with different amount of noise level.
First noise vector contains random noise values between 0 and 15, second
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noise vector contains values between 0 and 30, and third noise vector has
values between 0 and 100. The noise is added in such a way that smaller
packet length gets smaller amount of noise and so on. First noise vector was
added to the packet lengths whose value is less than 150 bytes. Similarly,
second noise vector was added to the packet lengths between 150 and 1000
bytes and third noise vector was added to the packet length values over 1000
bytes. This preserves the overall distribution of the packet length shown in
histogram in figure 5.7 and for time stamp field shown in figure 5.8. For
adding noise in time-stamp, the amount of random noise is reduced to 0 to
10 for first noise vector, 0 to 15 for second and 0 to 30 for third noise vector
according to the values in time stamp field.
Figure 5.7: Histogram of packet length of original and perturbed data
Histograms in figure 5.7 and 5.8 show that perturbed distribution work
well for one half of the data values while for other half the noise distribution
has lower peaks as compare to original data. In histogram for time stamp
field shown in figure 5.8, the two distributions are not perfect mirror of each
other since they contains different peaks at different time intervals.
5.2.1 Comparison between raw and perturbed data
Five number summary for packet length and time stamp is given below.
It can be seen that corresponding values differ from each other from small
margin. This technique also provides almost similar statistical values as the
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Figure 5.8: Histogram of time stamp of original and perturbed data
original data.
Five number summary of original packet length field:
(Minimum, Q1, Median, Q3, Maximum) = 44, 62, 109, 1414, 1514
Five number summary of perturbed packet length field:
(Minimum, Q1, Median, Q3, Maximum) = 12, 61, 99, 1376, 1694
Five number summary of original time-stamp field:
(Minimum, Q1, Median, Q3, Maximum) = 0, 178, 282, 421, 546
Five number summary of perturbed time-stamp field:
(Minimum, Q1, Median, Q3, Maximum) = 0, 180, 282, 421, 577
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5.3 Noise addition by summing LSBs
Noise addition by summing LSBs is new proposed technique by this thesis
work. It is very simple and works very well for numerical fields containing at
most 4 digits. This technique does not require generation of random noise
vector but instead it utilizes original values of the data to generate the noise
values. At first, most significant bit (MSB) of the original values is kept
as it is and remaining digits of the original value are summed together and
appended with MSB to get the noise values. perturbed value is obtained by
adding the original value and noise value. For example, for packet length of
1414, MSB 1 is kept intact and all the LSBs i.e. 414 are summed together
which yields 9. Adding this to original value will give perturbed value as
1423. Every number in the field is different so their sum generates the ran-
dom number and only same numbers can generate similar random numbers.
Figure 5.9 depicts the histogram of both original and perturbed data.
Figure 5.9: Histogram of packet length of original and perturbed data
5.3.1 Comparison between raw and perturbed data
From the figure 5.9, it is shown that this technique works well for packet
length field as the perturbed distribution has the similar patterns as the
original distribution however it is bit shifted towards high values. Table 5.2
shows the statistical properties of the original and perturbed data with five
CHAPTER 5. IMPLEMENTATIONOF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY TECHNIQUE50
number summary.
Mean Standard deviation
Original
data
495.54 615.13
Perturbed
data
502.39 617.85
Table 5.2: Statistical properties of original and perturbed data
Five number summary of original packet length field:
(Minimum, Q1, Median, Q3, Maximum) = 44, 62, 109, 1414, 1514
Five number summary of perturbed packet length field:
(Minimum, Q1, Median, Q3, Maximum) = 48, 64,115, 1423, 1524
5.4 Discussion
Three novel techniques of random noise addition in continuous data fields
are discussed in this chapter. In differential privacy technique, the value of
privacy parameter  is important as it determines the level of privacy to be
guaranteed. It can be observed that value of =0.1 is most suitable. By com-
paring the statistical properties for this technique, the mean of the standard
deviation in both original and perturbed data are very close to each other
which means that data points in both data sets are equally deviated from the
mean as both data sets rise and fall together along the time axis. Differential
privacy technique with =0.1 proved to be the best noise addition technique
as it completely preserves the statistical values like mean and standard de-
viation of the data set.
Zero mean noise addition technique worked well for the first half of the
data set but for other half it produced different patterns in the histogram.
Also by looking at five number summary of both raw and perturbed data, it
seems that this technique is not as effective as differential privacy technique.
Noise addition by summing LSBs technique is new proposed technique.
It is found that this technique is very useful for numerical values of up to
size 4 digits and give exaggerate results when this limit is exceeded, therefore
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this technique has been only implemented on packet length field and not on
time stamp field which contains fairly large number of digits.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, some noise addition techniques were implemented for the
purpose of anonymization of network trace. Random noise was added to
packet length and time stamp fields using these techniques. After perturbing
these two fields, results of each technique was compared with original data
fields by five number summary and box plot which is used as statistical
method to compare the distributions.
Chapter 6
Implementation of `-diversity tech-
nique
After obfuscating the data sets using k-anonymity technique, there seem to
be the number of identical records present in the anonymized data and it
has been found that inference can be made to individuals even when data is
anonymized, this is where `-diversity technique made its basis.
The main idea behind this technique is to create number of blocks of data
set. The size of the block depends on the total size of data set. Large data
sets usually require the blocks of larger length. The distribution of discrete
fields values i.e. protocol field, needs to be consistent in each block. Fig-
ure 6.1 shows the percentage of protocol distribution present in the network
trace trace. The benefit of `-diversity technique is to introduce the diversity
of protocols fields in each block. If this is not done, the certain portion of
data which contains same protocol fields would be vulnerable to inference
attack.
6.1 Equivalence class creation
In order to obfuscate the protocol value, it can be changed to its equivalence
class name. The benefit of doing so is to avoid any inference attack which
might occur if original protocol values are exposed.
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Figure 6.1: Percentage of most used protocols
Protocol field in network trace can be grouped in a family equivalence
class, where family name represents the characteristics of its members. To
create the protocol equivalence classes, type of protocols present in the data
set are examined first and then protocols of similar functionality are grouped
and are put in their respective equivalence class for example TCP, UDP and
other transport protocols, are placed in equivalence class named as transport
protocol. Similarly protocols like ICMP, DNS, ARP etc, are replaced with
equivalence class named as management protocols. This process is repeated
for all protocols. Table 6.1 depicts the protocol equivalence class family and
its members. Although, replacing the protocol field value with its equiva-
lence class name ruins some amount of data but it still gives some amount
of information that what types of protocol were anonymized, this is actually
the trade-off between utility and privacy.
Number of occurrence of each protocols equivalence class can be easily
calculated now. Distribution of each protocols equivalence class is plotted
using again pie chart in Figure 6.2.
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Equivalence class name ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Transport Protocols TCP UDP ∗ ∗
Management Protocols DNS ARP DHCP ICMP
Security Protocols TLS SSL TLSv1 TLSv2
Mobile Networks Protocols GTP UCP SSMP GTPv2
Other Protocols ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
Table 6.1: Equivalence class of protocols
Figure 6.2: Distribution of protocol equivalence class
In network trace, it was determined that how many number of blocks of
which length should be created. This is done by selecting the length of each
block as 100 and then dividing this length to the length of whole data set to
get the total number of blocks. It should also be assured that percentage of
each protocol type remains same in each block of data.
6.2 Results
The number of equivalence class determines the ` parameter in `-diversity
technique i.e. three equivalence classes will give 3-diverse anonymized data
set and so on. In the network trace, five protocol equivalence classes were
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created and therefore anonymized network trace is 5-diverse.
The question of how many number of equivalence class should be suffi-
cient, depends upon level of anonymization needed. The relation between
` parameter and privacy is direct, meaning that the higher the ` parame-
ter the better the privacy so number of equivalence classes determines the
level of ensured protection. Figure 6.3 shows the sample portion of 5-diverse
anonymized data where is `=5 indicating the number of diverse values in
each block of the data field.
Figure 6.3: 5-diverse anonymized data sets
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6.3 Summary
In this chapter, anonymization technique called `-diversity is presented to
obfuscate discrete fields in the network trace file. Implementation of this
technique is carried out by creating protocol equivalence class and diversi-
fying its distribution. In the result section, analysis is presented along with
the sample of anonymized data set.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
This chapter presents the summary of the results and possible implication of
these results.
7.1 Summary of results
The aim of this master’s thesis work is to anonymize network trace file to
protect user privacy. This thesis also explains some statistical analysis meth-
ods that can be used to compare statistical propertied of two network traces.
During statistical analysis of the network trace, it was found that pro-
tocol and packet length have some functional dependencies over each other
for example certain protocols which carry only management information like
DNS, ARP, DHCP etc have packet length of size less than 200 bytes while
some protocol which carry data payload i.e. TCP, UDP etc are heavier in
size e.g. 1500 bytes. Therefore, one has to keep these dependencies in mind
when anonymizing the network trace.
Differential privacy technique is used to anonymize continuous fields of
the network data. The privacy parameter  was found to be very important
in deciding the level of noise to be added to the data fields. Different values
of  were used to observe the effect of noise addition to the data fields and it
was observed that as value of  approached to zero, the data field is modified
significantly since noise magnitude approached to infinity.
In order to anonymize protocol field, `-diversity technique proves to be
very useful. Each block of the anonymized data contains well represented or
diversified values of the protocol fields. This is done changing the representa-
57
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 58
tion of the values by creating equivalence class and replacing protocol values
by their corresponding equivalence class. This although ruins fair amount of
information but on the other hand provides better privacy.
The level anonymization needed in data set can be determined from the
type of analysis carried out on the data set. If the data set is to be published
publically for research use, the sensitive fields can be heavily anonymized
so that nobody can de-anonymize it. For some useful analysis for example
detecting anomalies, the level of anonymization is set such that it shouldn’t
ruin the data significantly while still preserving the user privacy.
There exist plenty of ways to anonymize IP addresses, traditionally it is
done by hashing or changing them to some real number but these methods
don’t provide any means to carry out statistical analysis over anonymized IP
addresses. Two different ways were tried in this thesis work to anonymize
IP addresses. First method suppresses the last octet of the IP address while
keeping other octets as intact. This technique ensures that user who gen-
erated the data packet cannot be traced back while on the hand provides
information about the network topology which might be useful in certain
analysis. In the second technique, the IP addresses were replaced with their
corresponding class type for example 192.168.1.10 IP is replaced by Class
C. Although this technique ruins the information about the network ID and
subnet mask but still provides some information about which class of IP
address was used.
Chapter 8
Future work
This section gives some of the topics that were not covered in this work and
can be extended as future work. Figure 8.1 depicts road map of our work
and also some future work in Blue Square.
Framework for calculating value of privacy parameter : A frame-
work can be created that calculate the best value of privacy parameter  for
any given network trace. The framework can be capable of getting data set
as input, process it, applying -differential privacy technique and producing
the anonymized trace.
Re-identification testing: The anonymized data set can be processed
again to check if it can be de-anonymized to certain level of confidence. This
can tell about the efficiency of the anonymization algorithms.
Anomaly detection: This work can be extended in a way that it be-
comes possible to detect anomalies i.e. Malware detection. This can be
accomplished by achieving the right level of anonymization i.e. suitable pa-
rameters of privacy algorithms.
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Figure 8.1: An overview of this thesis work
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